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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine for a moment that you are the proud homeowner of a singlefamily home in Florida. Now imagine that you and three neighboring
homeowners share a private driveway that straddles the property line
between the four lots, allowing vehicular and pedestrian ingress and egress
for all four owners to and from a public road. Assume this private
easement of way is expressly granted in the deeds to all four lots and duly
recorded with the local municipality. Perhaps the driveway has a dirt or
gravel-type surface, because neither you nor your neighbors wish to foot
the bill to have the driveway paved. You and your neighbors use the
driveway daily, driving across it when traveling to and from work, walking
across it when exercising your dog, and walking on it when playing a game
of catch with neighborhood children. Although you and your neighbors
have never met to discuss who should shoulder the responsibility of the
driveway’s maintenance, you and your neighbors are all very amicable
towards one another, and no disputes ever seem to arise regarding the
driveway use and maintenance.
Suppose, however, your neighbor’s elderly Aunt Ida visits and steps
into a pothole on the driveway while walking out to get the mail in front of
your neighbor’s house. She breaks her ankle, and the impact from her fall
severely aggravates her arthritic back condition. You may be surprised to
learn that although the injury occurred on the portion of the easement
crossing your neighbor’s land, and to one of his guests, a Florida court may
find that you are at least partly responsible for her injuries.1
Suppose alternatively that you, being a responsible and prudent person,
foresee the possibility of such an incident occurring and spend several
hundred dollars and an entire Saturday repairing potholes on the driveway.
Or perhaps you go even further and hire professionals to grade the road and
make it safer for travel. You may be surprised to learn that such action on
your behalf may actually make you more likely to be held liable for Aunt
Ida’s injuries.2 To the average reader, this result does not make sense! Why
should the law punish those who exercise foresight and care, including
making repairs, while neighbors who sit idly by are effectively rewarded
for their lack of care?
1. See Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d 1003, 1005 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
2. See id.
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Suppose that instead of Aunt Ida being injured, a local jogger
mistakenly runs down the driveway one night. He trips and falls in a
pothole and suffers injuries, and then surprises you and your neighbors
with a lawsuit. Should your liability hinge on whether he fell on that part of
the driveway that runs over your property or a part that runs over one of
your neighbors’ property? Should the fact that his presence on the
driveway, unlike Aunt Ida’s, was not invited or authorized, carry
significance? Should the fact that you or one of your neighbors previously
attempted to make repairs to the driveway make either of you either more
or less responsible for the injuries? Should you purchase liability insurance
covering your portion of, or the entire, driveway?3 The answers to these
questions lie within the confusing area of easement liability issues, which
are dependent upon the law of negligence (specifically premises liability)
and on real property law.4 This Note focuses on these liability issues where
easement law in Florida and other states is unclear.
In Part II, this Note briefly reviews easement law terminology and
introduces existing secondary commentary. In Part III, this Note thoroughly
examines the current status of the law in Florida, with a particular focus on
Collom v. Holton.5 In Part IV, this Note focuses on the effect a third-party
entrant’s status has on the duty and liability of dominant and servient estate
owners. Then, in Part V, this Note analyzes other jurisdictions’ approaches
for guidance in formulating possible standards. Finally, in Part VI, this
Note examines several possible solutions that Florida could adopt to
resolve ambiguity and foster more predictable future decisions. This Note
concludes by arguing for adoption of the “control” standard, similar to that
of New York, so that Florida can provide transparency and predictability to
its property owners. This increased transparency and predictability would
provide Floridians with better notice and facilitate informed decisions
regarding whether to insure their interest and when and whether to make
the repairs necessary to protect against injuries.
II. A BACKGROUND OF EASEMENT LIABILITY ISSUES
A. A Brief Review of Terminology
An easement, in the simplest terms, is a nonpossessory interest in land
that grants one party a limited right to use the land of another.6 The
3. It is vital for dominant and servient owners owning or subject to easements to know for
which types of injuries they might be forced to compensate, and for which portion of the easement
they are responsible, so that they may adequately insure themselves against liability. This
knowledge is also important so that, if they choose, they may enter express maintenance agreements
that adequately protect themselves.
4. Andree Brooks, Talking: Easements; Law Can Trip the Unwary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1987, at R9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/13/realestate/talking-easements-lawcan-trip-the-unwary.html.
5. 449 So. 2d at 1005 n.1.
6. 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.01[1] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2009).
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easement owner, the party who owns the limited right of use, is commonly
referred to as the “dominant” estate.7 The underlying land owner, the party
whose land is subject to another’s limited right of use, is commonly
referred to as the “servient” estate.8 Thus, with a shared private driveway
easement, each party is a dominant estate with respect to that portion of his
neighbor’s property which he possesses the right to cross, and each party is
a servient estate with respect to that portion of his own property that is
subject to the neighbor’s right to cross. Additionally, a servient owner
subject to a nonexclusive easement may continue to make any use of that
property, so long as he does not unreasonably interfere with the dominant
owner’s right of limited use.9 Another important general rule of easement
law is that a dominant owner has the right to enter the servient land, even
on portions not on the actual easement, to the extent reasonably necessary
to make repairs.10 This right is known as a “‘secondary easement.’”11
B. Existing Secondary Commentary
Secondary commentary is sparse regarding easement liability issues,
which implicate principles from both negligence law and real property
law.12 The few secondary sources that acknowledge the issue briefly gloss
over it with generalized statements.13 Thompson on Real Property explains
that the dominant owner is responsible where the servient owner is subject
to an exclusive easement or where the servient owner makes no use of the
easement, but it fails to address the issue of liability for injuries on shared
easements.14 Jon W. Bruce and James W. Ely, Jr. offer that though a
servient owner usually does not have an obligation to perform maintenance
on the easement absent express agreement, “arguably the servient owner
may be liable in tort for injuries suffered by third parties in the easement
area owing to the servient owner’s negligence.”15 Other sources cite similar
language that the servient owner might be held liable in certain situations.16
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.9 (2000).
10. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND
§ 8:38 (2009).
11. Id.
12. Brooks, supra note 4.
13. See 41 FLA. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 7 (2008); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 395 (2000);
BRUCE & ELY, supra note 10, § 8:37. For example, Thompson on Real Property states generally that
“[d]ominant owners are responsible not only for the repair and maintenance of an easement, but
also for any damage occurring from failure to maintain and repair.” 7 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY § 60.05(b) (David A. Thomas, ed., 2006).
14. See 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 60.05(b).
15. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 10, § 8:37.
16. See, e.g., 41 FLA. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 7 (2008); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 395
(2000).
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C. Current State of the Law in Florida
In Florida, as in other states,17 the law regarding tort liability associated
with easements where no express agreement exists remains uncertain and
undeveloped. It is the long-established rule that the duty to improve or
maintain an easement rests on the owner of the easement, the dominant
estate.18 This principle has been fully accepted in Florida.19 It is quite
unclear, however, under what circumstances, in the absence of express
agreement, this duty shifts to the servient owner. Similarly, it is unclear
when the duty to protect against injury shifts entirely to the servient owner,
or when both the dominant and servient owners may each be held liable for
injuries to third parties. Additionally, it remains ambiguous what role the
status of the third party on the easement plays in determining liability.
Such ambiguity leaves Florida landowners little guidance as to what
maintenance measures they should undertake and what insurance coverage
they should purchase to protect themselves from liability for injuries on
their easement holdings, particularly on easements of way such as private
driveways. To resolve disputes in recent times, courts and commentators
have relied heavily and ironically on the ambiguous Footnote 1 in Collom
v. Holton.20
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLOM V. HOLTON
A. Collom v. Holton, Footnote 1
In Florida, the primary authority regarding premises liability for injuries
suffered due to a negligent condition on an easement is the Second District
Court of Appeal’s 1984 opinion Collom v. Holton.21 In fact, Collom v.
Holton is the sole authority regarding this issue cited by Florida’s legal
encyclopedia22 and by national legal encyclopedias such as Corpus Juris
Secundum.23 Peculiarly, these secondary sources cite not to the holding of
the case, but to a footnote, which arguably constitutes mere dicta.24 The
Collom v. Holton footnote states:
The duty to maintain an easement in a safe condition to
prevent injuries to third parties generally rests on the owner of
the dominant estate, Morrill v. Recreational Development,
Inc., 414 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), unless (1) there is
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See Brooks, supra note 4.
Morrill v. Recreational Dev., Inc., 414 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Zipkin v. Rubin Constr. Co., 418 So. 2d 1040, 1043 n.5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d 1003, 1005 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
Id.
41 FLA. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 7 (2008).
65A C.J.S. Negligence § 395 (2000).
41 FLA. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 7 (2008); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 395 (2000).
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an agreement requiring the servient owner either solely or
concurrently to maintain and control the easement, Sebastian
River Drainage District v. Ansin, 29 Fla. Supp. 77, aff’d, 223
So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); or (2) the evidence indicates
that the servient owner affirmatively and voluntarily
otherwise assumed responsibility for maintaining the
easement in a safe condition as to persons with the same
status as the decedents. Cf., Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla.
661, 140 So. 893 (1932); Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New
York v. L.F.E. Corp., 382 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (the
latter two cases state the general rule with respect to voluntary
assumption of a duty).25
To properly understand the context of the footnote, one must consider
the earlier decision of City of St. Petersburg v. Collom.26 In this case,
Collom alleged that his wife and daughter were walking across private
property owned by Mr. Holton27 during a heavy rainstorm.28 While
crossing this property, they unknowingly stepped into a storm sewer
drainage ditch on a drainage easement owned by the City of St.
Petersburg.29 The rushing water swept them through an unprotected sewer
pipe opening to their deaths.30 Collom subsequently filed wrongful death
actions against both the City of St. Petersburg and Mr. Holton, the servient
owner.31 Presumptively because the City of St. Petersburg’s duty as a
dominant estate was widely recognized and not contested, the City of St.
Petersburg v. Collom decision hinged on the distinction between
government liability for “operational-level” functions versus government
immunity for “planning-level” functions32 instead of on easement law.33
However, in Collom v. Holton, easement law was the primary focus.
The Collom v. Holton decision provides some insight into easement law
and the issue of whether Mr. Holton, the servient owner,34 can also be held
liable for the deaths of Mr. Collom’s wife and daughter. In Collom v.
25. Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d at 1005 n.1.
26. 419 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1982). Here, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Bert H. Collom’s
successful appeal of the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment for the city in his wrongful death
action for the death of his wife and daughter. Collom v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 So. 2d 507,
508–10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), aff’d, 419 So. 2d 1082, 1087 (Fla. 1982).
27. Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d at 1004.
28. City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 1982).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d at 1004; Collom v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 So. 2d at
508–10.
32. City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d at 1083.
33. See Morrill v. Recreational Dev., Inc., 414 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
34. Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d at 1004.
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Holton, the trial court found that the wife and daughter were “uninvited
licensees” on Mr. Holton’s property and granted summary judgment for
Mr. Holton.35 While the Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the
trial court that the decedents were uninvited licensees, it nevertheless
found genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether a duty
actually existed36 and, if so, whether Mr. Holton breached this duty of care
owed to the decedents.37 Specifically, the court listed five questions to be
answered by the jury:
(1) whether a dangerous condition relating to the drainage
ditch in fact existed on Holton’s property; and if so, (2)
whether any duty normally owed by Holton as a landowner
was negated by the presence of an easement, if one in fact
exists, in the City’s favor;1 and, if not negated, (3) whether the
dangerous condition was not open to ordinary observation by
the decedents as they crossed onto Holton’s property; (4)
whether Holton actually knew (this can be shown by
circumstantial evidence) of the existence of the hazardous
condition; and (5) whether Holton breached his duty to warn
(a reasonable person standard) the decedents of the dangerous
condition.38
It is in this list that Footnote 1 appears. These exact questions would
not apply to every third party injured on an easement, because the court
derived them from the standard of care owed to an uninvited licensee,
which is to
refrain from wanton negligence or wilful misconduct which
would injure [the uninvited licensee], to refrain from
intentionally exposing [the uninvited licensee] to danger and
to warn [the uninvited licensee] of a defect or condition
known to the landowner to be dangerous when such danger is
not open to ordinary observation by the licensee.39
The court concluded by emphasizing that City of St. Petersburg v.
Collom’s holding, that a jury was allowed to decide whether the City was
liable, does not preclude a jury from determining whether Mr. Holton was
also liable for the deaths.40

35. Id.
36. This is an unusual instance where the existence of a duty of care is a question of fact for
the jury. Usually, duty is determined by the judge as a matter of law.
37. Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d at 1004–05.
38. Id. at 1005.
39. Id. (quoting Libby v. West Coast Rock Co., Inc., 308 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)).
40. Id. at 1005 n.2.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 7

836

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

B. The “Unless” Language in Collom v. Holton, Footnote 1
Upon first glance, the word “unless” in Footnote 1 may lead one to
believe that the presence of an agreement regarding, or an affirmative or
voluntary assumption by the servient owner of, the duty to maintain an
easement absolves the easement owner’s liability.41 However, such a
conclusion requires an unwarranted logical leap. Footnote 1 focuses on
when a servient owner may be held liable, not on when the dominant
owner is absolved from liability. For example, the presence of an
agreement requiring the servient owner to “concurrently” maintain the
easement logically should not absolve the dominant owner’s duty to third
parties, because the agreement requires him to maintain the easement along
with the servient owner. With such an agreement, it seems logical that both
owners should be jointly liable, a conclusion several courts have reached.42
This apparently is also the interpretation reached in Florida Jurisprudence,
Second, which clarifies Footnote 1’s language by eliminating the word
“unless” and instead writes “the servient owner may also be held
responsible” where there is an agreement, or where the servient owner
affirmatively and voluntarily otherwise assumes maintenance
responsibility.43 This is the better-reasoned interpretation of Footnote 1.
C. What Constitutes “Affirmatively and Voluntarily Otherwise”
Assuming Responsibility for Maintaining an Easement in a Safe
Condition?
Another confusing aspect of Footnote 1 is that it gives little guidance
concerning how or when a servient owner “affirmatively and voluntarily
otherwise” assumes “responsibility for maintaining the easement.”44 The
Collom v. Holton court probably did not envision this phrase to apply to a
contractual assumption of the maintenance responsibility. A contractual
assumption appears to be covered by point (1) of Footnote 1, as an
“agreement requiring the servient owner . . . to maintain and control the
easement.”45 Accordingly, this assumption must be some physical action
undertaken by the servient owner, as opposed to a contractual agreement.
However, several questions linger: How much action must the servient
owner undertake before he assumes the responsibility to maintain the
easement in a safe condition with respect to third parties? And is the
responsibility assumed by merely making rudimentary repairs on a casual
basis, or only by comprehensively undertaking a grading or repaving effort
that affects the entire easement?
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 1005 n.1.
See, e.g., Mills v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.S.2d 507, 510 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947).
41 FLA. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 7 (2008) (emphasis added).
Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d at 1005 n.1.
Id.
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The cases cited after point (2) of Footnote 1 offer little value in
answering these questions.46 These cases did not involve easements
whatsoever. Possibly more helpful, however, is the parenthetical
accompanying these cases, stating that “the latter two cases state the
general rule with respect to voluntary assumption of a duty.”47 This
parenthetical references the “undertaker’s doctrine”—negligence law’s
general principle that anyone providing services, whether by contract or
gratuitously, is under an obligation to exercise reasonable care.48 This
“undertaker’s doctrine” imposes a duty on the individual to act carefully
and to not put others, including third parties, at an undue risk of harm.49
Herein lies the rationale behind why a servient owner subject to a private
driveway easement, who gratuitously repairs potholes or otherwise
attempts to maintain the driveway in a safe condition, may actually be
exposing himself to additional liability for injuries to third parties.
IV. SERVIENT OWNERS OF NONEXCLUSIVE EASEMENTS IN FLORIDA
MIGHT ALWAYS BE LIABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF EXPRESS AGREEMENT
A. Zipkin v. Rubin Construction Co.
Regardless of whether servient owners are liable under Footnote 1,
servient owners subject merely to easements for ingress and egress may
nonetheless remain liable for injuries to third parties.50 This is because the
servient owner retains some authority over the easement road.51 Wilkinson,
a defendant in Zipkin v. Rubin Construction Co.52 owned land subject to an
easement roadway for ingress and egress which spanned a dike separating
the water and drainage systems of neighboring farms.53 The Rubin
Construction Co. extracted shell rock regularly from Wilkinson’s neighbor
Gilbert, who owned the easement.54 Due to Rubin’s need to increase heavy
traffic on the easement, it agreed with a trucking contractor to resurface the
46. See generally Banfield v. Addington, 140 So. 893 (Fla. 1932) (stating the general rule for
assumption of a duty); Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. L.F.E. Corp., 382 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
(stating the general rule for assumption of a duty).
47. Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d at 1005 n.1.
48. Union Park Mem’l Chapel v. Hutt, 670 So. 2d 64, 66–67 (Fla. 1996) (“It is clearly
established that one who undertakes to act, even when under no obligation to do so, thereby
becomes obligated to act with reasonable care.”); see 38 FLA. JUR. 2D Negligence § 21 (2005).
49. See Clay Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 1186 (Fla. 2003); 38 FLA. JUR.
2D Negligence § 21 (2005).
50. Zipkin v. Rubin Constr. Co., 418 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); cf. Sutera v.
Go Jokir, Inc., 86 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that “joint liability can attach where the
property is used by both the dominant and servient owners”).
51. Zipkin, 418 So. 2d at 1042.
52. 418 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
53. Id. at 1041.
54. Id. at 1041–42.
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easement road.55 Tragically, during the resurfacing about two feet of the
road at the edge of the dike gave way, sending a loaded truck upside-down
into the canal waters twelve feet below, drowning one of the contractor’s
truck drivers.56 Zipkin, the representative of the decedent’s estate, sued
several individuals, including Wilkinson.57
Wilkinson argued that because he could not exclude individuals, he was
absolved of any duty to third parties.58 The Zipkin court disagreed,
however, pointing to the Restatement (Second) of Property § 486, which
states that “[t]he possessor of land subject to an easement created by
conveyance is privileged to make such uses of the servient tenement as are
not inconsistent with the provisions of the creating conveyance.”59 The
court reasoned that the defendant landowner retained some authority over
the easement road, because he could use it himself and permit others to use
it, so long as such use did not impede the dominant estate’s right of ingress
and egress.60 Consequently, the court held that the presence of the
easement did not preclude consideration of the landowner’s duty to third
parties.61
It makes sense that while a servient owner subject to a nonexclusive
easement might be liable for injuries on easements of way, a servient
owner subject to an exclusive easement is not.62 This is because the latter
servient owner himself cannot make any use on land subject to an
exclusive easement, nor can he authorize others to enter it.63 Nevertheless,
to hold a servient owner liable for injuries to persons on a nonexclusive
easement of way directly contradicts the general rule that the duty to
protect against injuries to third parties generally lies with the dominant
estate.64 However, this contradiction triggers more questions: Should it
matter whether the injured party was on the easement at the authorization
or invitation of the servient owner, as opposed to at that of the dominant
owner? Should it matter whether the injured party bears no relation to
either the dominant or servient owner? Perhaps liability should hinge on
the status of the entrant with respect to both the dominant and servient
owners.
55. Id. at 1042.
56. Id. at 1041–42.
57. Id. at 1042.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (SIC) OF PROPERTY § 486).
60. Id.
61. Id. Ultimately, the court affirmed summary judgment in Wilkinson’s favor, finding that
the decedent possessed the status of an uninvited licensee with respect to Wilkinson. Id. at 1043–
44. Because the dangers presented by the situation were open and readily comprehensible, not
hidden, Wilkinson did not breach any duty owed to the decedent by failing to warn him of the perils
involved. Id. at 1044. For a further discussion of the duties owed to an uninvited licensee, see infra
Part IV.B.2.
62. See 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 395 (2000).
63. See Sutera v. Go Jokir, Inc., 86 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1996).
64. See Morrill v. Recreational Dev., Inc., 414 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
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B. Do Dominant and Servient Owners’ Liability Hinge on the Status
of the Third Party?
1. Trespassers
In cases involving injury to trespassers on easements, often neither the
dominant nor the servient owner is held liable. With respect to trespassers,
easement holders owe a duty only to refrain from willfully or wantonly
inflicting injury.65 Trespasser plaintiffs face great difficulty proving such
conduct by defendants, as illustrated by the Maryland decision Wagner v.
Doehring.66 The defendants in Wagner owned an easement for ingress and
egress to and from their residence, which was on a landlocked parcel
surrounded by an undeveloped investment parcel.67 The easement driveway
connected to an unlighted public road, running through a rural wooded
area.68 The defendants operated a dog kennel on their parcel.69
Unauthorized motorcyclists frequently raced across part of the easement to
access dirt trails on the servient parcel, startling the defendants, their
grandchildren, and their dogs.70 Ostensibly in an attempt to deny the
motorcyclists access to their driveway, the defendants stretched a chain
across its entrance, attaching it to two poles.71
Tragically, late one night the plaintiff struck the chain while riding his
motorcycle without a helmet and without the use of headlights, sustaining
fatal injuries.72 In holding the defendants owed only a duty to refrain from
willfully or wantonly injuring the decedent, the court explained that such
limited liability allows “‘a person to use his own land in his own way,
without the burden of watching for and protecting those who come there
without permission or right.’”73 The court cautioned that if the injured
party were one whom the defendants could not exclude, such as an invitee
of the servient estate, they would certainly have owed a different duty of
care.74 However, the Wagner court found that the holder of a right-of-way
is not entitled to such limited liability75 and explained that a “possessor of
land” in tort law is altogether different from a “possessor of land” in
property law.76 The duty of an easement owner to a third party is derived
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
1984)).
74.
75.
76.

See Wagner v. Doehring, 553 A.2d 684, 687 (Md. 1989).
Id. at 689.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 687 (quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 58, at 395 (W. Keeton 5th ed.,
Id. at 689 n.5.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 688.
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from the tort definition of “possessor.”77 “By exercising control over and
using the right-of-way, the easement holder is in occupation of the land—
thus, in possession of that land.”78 Finding that the defendants did not
willfully or wantonly seek to injure the decedent, the court concluded that
the defendants’ actions were entirely within their rights as possessors of the
land.79
2. Uninvited Licensees
Further emphasizing the importance of third-party status, Zipkin v.
Rubin Construction Co., addresses uninvited licensees and illustrates the
widely-accepted principle that a third-party entrant on an easement may
have a different legal status with respect to the dominant owner than he has
with respect to the servient owner.80 In fact, an “easement is a particularly
relevant factor in determining the entrant’s status vis-à-vis the
landowner.”81 An entrant’s status and the corresponding duty owed by a
landowner “must be gleaned from the relationship between the two. ‘[I]t is
the relationship established between persons which must be the criterion
for the duty owed.’”82 An uninvited licensee in Florida is one who is
neither an invitee nor a trespasser, but who “enters upon the property of
another for his own convenience, pleasure, or benefit.”83 The truck-driver
plaintiff in Zipkin, for example, presumptively an invitee of the dominant
owner for whom he was working, was held an uninvited licensee with
respect to the servient owner.84 The duty owed to a licensee is to refrain
from willfully or wantonly inflicting injury, to refrain from intentionally
exposing him to danger, and to warn him of a known dangerous defect or
condition not open to ordinary observation.85 Interestingly, even though the
duty owed an uninvited licensee varies slightly from the duty owed a
trespasser, this difference appears to have little or no bearing on whether a
dominant owner is any more or less likely to be held liable for injuries to
an uninvited licensee.
3. Invitees
One might intuitively think that the party, whether the dominant or
servient owner, who invites the injured third party should be held
responsible for the third party’s injuries. After all, one might argue that the
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 689.
Zipkin v. Rubin Constr. Co., 418 So. 2d 1040, 1042–43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1043 (quoting Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 694 (Fla. 1973)).
Id. at 1043 n.3.
Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1044.
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party who expects a third party’s presence on the easement is in a better
position to protect against injury to that person. Most decisions, however,
focus not on the relationship between the third party and the dominant and
servient owners to determine liability, but rather on the level of control
each owner exerted over the easement.86 However, the relationship of each
owner to the injured third party is not without consequence because it
determines the duty owed by each owner, and in that respect it can affect
the outcome of a case.87
Cesario v. Chiapparine provides an excellent example of this outcomedeterminative effect.88 The plaintiff in Cesario, Vincenza Cesario, was a
social guest residing temporarily at the defendant’s, Emelia Cesario,
home.89 A concrete driveway alley approximately seven or eight feet in
width spanned the gap between Emelia Cesario’s home and the home of
the other defendant, Chiapparine.90 Cesario owned two feet of the alley,
Chiapparine owned the remaining five feet, and Cesario owned an
easement over Chiapparine’s five feet for ingress and egress to a garage
behind Cesario’s house.91 A drainpipe gutter regularly discharged water
from Chiapparine’s roof onto the driveway alley and into a drain.92 On a
cold day, the plaintiff (Vincenza Cesario) slipped and fell on ice that had
formed on the alley, landing on her back and sustaining injuries.93 The trial
court dismissed the complaint in favor of both defendants (Emelia Cesario
and Chiapparine).94
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal with respect to the
defendant, Emelia Cesario, holding that she owed the plaintiff only the
duty owed to licensees—the duty not to willfully injure, to make dangers
known, and to warn.95 The appellate court reversed with respect to the
defendant, Chiapparine, however, holding that she owed the plaintiff the
duty owed to business invitees.96 The court explained that as a social guest
of Emelia Cesario, the plaintiff enjoyed the same status vis-à-vis
Chiapparine as did her host—that of a business invitee—due to Emelia
Cesario’s purchase of the easement from Chiapparine.97 Thus, the duty
86. See Sutera v. Go Jokir, Inc., 86 F.3d 298, 308 (2d Cir. 1996); Cardinal v. Long Island
Power Auth., 309 F. Supp. 2d 376, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); McIntyre v. Boston Redevelopment
Auth., 595 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
87. See Cesario v. Chiapparine, 250 N.Y.S.2d 584, 591 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).
88. Id. at 591.
89. Id. at 586.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 587.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 589.
96. Id. at 590, 592.
97. Id. at 589.
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owed to the plaintiff by Chiapparine was equivalent to the standard
exercise of reasonable care in maintaining the premises.98 Accordingly, the
appellate court remanded the case for a new trial.99 Thus, Cesario shows
that while not ipso facto determinative of whether the dominant or servient
estate will be liable for injuries to third parties, the status of the third party
with respect to each can ultimately influence liability.
V. GUIDANCE FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. General Acceptance of the Zipkin Principle: North Carolina’s
Hartman v. Walkertown Shopping Center, Inc.100
It appears that the Zipkin principle, or the possibility of holding servient
owners liable for injuries on nonexclusive easements based on their status
as underlying landowners101 is well-recognized in other states. One
example is North Carolina, which also holds that a servient owner may be
held liable for injuries despite the presence of an easement.102 In Hartman,
upon returning to his car from a video store, the plaintiff stepped off a
sidewalk into a depressed water meter cover in the blacktop surface of a
parking lot owned by the defendant shopping center owner.103 The water
meter, which the plaintiff testified was four to six inches below the parking
lot surface, laid on an easement granted by the defendant to the local
sanitary district.104 The plaintiff alleged that as an invitee, the defendant
failed to warn him of the dangerous condition, the existence of which the
shopping center should have known.105 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.106
In reversing the trial court, the Hartman court applied the landowner’s
general standard of care owed to invitees—the “‘duty to exercise ordinary
care to maintain the premises in a safe condition and to warn the invitee of
hidden dangers or unsafe conditions, discoverable by the owner through
reasonable inspection and supervision.’”107 The court found that regardless
of the rule that the dominant owner is liable for injuries to third parties, the
defendant servient owner had an affirmative duty to warn.108 Thus, in the
presence of this duty to invitees, the trial court’s grant of summary

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 590.
Id. at 592.
439 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
See Zipkin v. Rubin Constr. Co., 418 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
Hartman, 439 S.E.2d at 791.
Id. at 788.
Id.
Id. at 788–89.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 791 (quoting Stoltz v. Burton, 316 S.E.2d 646, 647 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)).
Id.
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judgment to the defendant was in error.109 However, the Hartman court did
not discuss whether action by the defendant servient owner to guard
against or correct the condition would have interfered with the easement
rights granted to the sanitary district.110
Notably, however, a Zipkin-like situation may potentially result in a
finding of no liability on behalf of the servient owner in the case of a
nonexclusive easement, as seen already in the Maryland high court
decision Wagner v. Doehring.111 In Wagner, the dominant estate owned a
nonexclusive easement for ingress and egress.112 The servient estate,
however, apparently owed no duty to third parties on the easement,
because it made no actual use whatsoever of the easement across its
undeveloped land.113
B. An Alternative Method: Pennsylvania’s “Abutting” Standard in
Borgel v. Hoffman
Beginning with the 1971 opinion Borgel v. Hoffman, Pennsylvania
undertook a rather unique equitable approach to liability for injuries to
third parties.114 The approach provides that when multiple owners share a
private road easement, in the absence of any maintenance agreement, each
owner is responsible for maintaining and repairing only the portion of the
driveway that abuts his own land.115 In Borgel, the plaintiff fell on a private
driveway which ran between two rows of houses, sustaining injuries.116
The plaintiff named only one defendant, the Hoffmans, who owned the
portion of the driveway on which the injuries occurred.117 The Hoffmans
claimed that the other homeowners who shared the driveway were jointly
or severally liable, or liable to the Hoffmans for contribution for the
plaintiff’s injuries.118 No maintenance agreement existed.119
The Borgel court rejected the general rule that the dominant estate owes
the duty to protect against injuries to third parties, because the property
owners in this situation were each dominant and servient owners.120 The
court ruled that “the respective rights and burdens of each of the property
owners must necessarily be determined by considerations of the equities
109. Id.
110. See Piluso v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 A.D.2d 68, 71 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
111. 553 A.2d 684, 689 (Md. 1989); see supra Part IV.A.
112. Wagner, 553 A.2d at 685.
113. See id. at 689; 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.05(b) (David A. Thomas, ed., 2006).
114. Borgel v. Hoffman, 280 A.2d 608, 610 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971).
115. Id.; Okkerse v. Howe, 593 A.2d 431, 433 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Oswald v. Hausman, 548
A.2d 594, 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Mscisz v. Russel, 487 A.2d 839, 840 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
116. 280 A.2d 608, 610 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 609.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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and expediencies involved.”121 The court reasoned that to hold each
dominant owner liable, no matter how far removed the site of injury from
that dominant owner’s land, would be unreasonable, inconvenient, and
inequitable.122 The court also reasoned that similar inequity would result
from attempting to arbitrarily pin liability on those dominant owners
residing “close” to the site of injury.123 Thus, the court concluded that
holding each owner responsible for repairing and maintaining only the
portion of the driveway abutting or located on his own land was the most
reasonable, expedient, and equitable rule.124
This rule regarding maintenance liability was cited with approval in
Mscisz v. Russell, which illustrates that the rule only applies in the
complete absence of any maintenance agreement.125 The plaintiff in Mscisz
was riding a motorcycle on a private driveway with multiple dominant
owners, when he fell and sustained injuries.126 The plaintiff sued the
owners of the parcel abutting the portion of the driveway at issue.127 The
defendants then joined over fifty neighbors who shared the private
driveway, claiming each had an equal duty to maintain.128 In reversing the
trial court’s summary judgment finding for these fifty-plus neighbor
defendants, the Mscisz court stressed that the presence of a covenant in the
deeds to each of the defendants’ parcels, which discussed sharing
maintenance expenses of the driveway, gave rise to genuine issues of
material fact.129 Thus, the court remanded the case for further
proceedings.130
This equitable rule from Borgel was again affirmed in Oswald v.
Hausman, where an elderly man got caught in a snowstorm and died of
hypothermia while driving on an unpaved section of a private driveway.131
No agreement existed regarding maintenance of the driveway, which had
multiple owners, so the responsibility fell on the owner whose land abutted
the portion of the driveway at issue.132 The court deemed the decedent a
trespasser, 133 however, and dismissed the case, finding that the defendant
owner did not breach any duty owed to trespassers.134
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 609–10.
Id. at 610.
Id.
Id.
487 A.2d 839, 840 (Pa. Super Ct. 1984).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 841.
Id.
548 A.2d 594, 595–96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
Id. at 597.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 600.
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C. New York: The “Control” Standard in Sutera v. Go Jokir, Inc.135
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit provided an
informative discussion regarding the duties owed to third parties by the
dominant and servient estates when it applied New York law in Sutera v.
Go Jokir, Inc.136 The plaintiff in Sutera, a police radio dispatcher, upon
exiting her car and walking towards the police department, slipped and fell
on a parking lot’s icy surface.137 She filed a complaint against Go Jokir,
Inc., the defendant, which, as the dominant estate, owned an easement to
use the parking lot on which the incident occurred.138 The servient owner
of the parcel was the Village of Spring Valley.139 The plaintiff alleged the
fall caused her to suffer back injuries and incur damages, including several
surgeries for a herniated disc.140 At issue, and of particular relevance, was
the fact that the defendant had a covenant with the Village, in the dulyrecorded easement document, which required the Village to clear snow and
ice from the parking area.141 Based on this agreement, the district court
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.142
In reversing the district court’s decision and remanding the case for
trial, the Sutera court held that once established, a dominant estate’s duty
toward third parties is not abrogated by a covenant for maintenance with
the servient owner.143 The court explained that the general rule allowing
servient owners to assume maintenance duties does not apply when the
rights of injured third parties are implicated; rather, it only applies to
disputes between dominant and servient owners themselves.144 In reaching
this result, the Sutera court explained that just like a landowner who under
New York law has certain non-delegable duties towards third parties, the
dominant owner’s duty is predicated on ownership control.145 Thus, the
court concluded, the maintenance covenant with the servient owner did not

135. 86 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1996).
136. Id. at 301.
137. Id. at 300.
138. Id. at 301.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 300.
141. Id. at 301.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 308.
144. Id. at 308–09.
145. Id. at 308; cf. Cardinal v. Long Island Power Auth., 309 F. Supp. 2d 376, 385 (E.D.N.Y.
2004); McIntyre v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 595 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992)
(holding that the presence of a highway easement owned by the city did not preclude the servient
landowner’s duty to third parties because the critical test was “who had the right to control the
property,” an issue of fact for the jury). Other jurisdictions have similarly held. See Reyna v. Ayco
Dev. Corp., 788 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that when an owner transfers
control of the premises to another, the owner owes no duty to those who enter the premises).
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absolve the dominant owner of its duties to third parties.146 Rather, joint
liability can attach where the easement is used by both the dominant and
servient owners.147
In 2003, a New York state court, approving the analysis in Sutera,148
held that a servient owner may be liable for injuries to third parties based
not on duties corollary to the easement, but rather on the duty to warn
invitees.149 The plaintiff in Piluso v. Bell Atlantic Corporation was jogging
with his dog one evening in the back parking lot of a housing complex
owned by the defendant.150 In poor visibility conditions, running in an area
with which he was unfamiliar, the plaintiff tripped over an “outer anchor
guy wire” running from a utility pole diagonally down to the ground.151
The plaintiff suffered two broken bones in his hand as a result of his
subsequent fall.152 The court noted that a servient owner has no duty to
maintain an easement, and that the defendant demonstrated through
uncontroverted evidence that it neither owned nor controlled the utility
pole and the guy wire.153 Although the anchor wire was owned by a utility
company and located on an easement of which the defendant was the
servient owner, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, and the appellate court affirmed.154
In reaching its conclusion, the appellate court pointed out that the
defendant may be liable to the plaintiff on the theory that it failed to warn
the defendant of the dangerous condition presented by the guy wire.155 The
court held that despite the presence of the easement, negligence principles,
including the duty to protect entrants from a latent hazard, controlled.156
The court rejected the defendant’s reliance on similar cases granting
summary judgment to servient owners, where entrants were injured by
contact with electrical transformers and other power equipment.157 The
court determined that the distinguishing factor at bar was that the servient
owner could have easily protected against the hazardous guy wire without
interfering with the utility companies’ easement rights, whereas any
tampering with a utility company’s transformer “‘would clearly encroach
upon the rights’” granted by the easement.158
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Sutera, 86 F.3d at 308–09.
Id. at 304.
Piluso v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 A.D.2d 68, 71 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
Id. at 72.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id. at 71–72; see Green v. Duke Power Co., 290 S.E.2d 593, 598 (N.C. 1982).
Piluso, 305 A.D.2d at 71 (quoting Green, 290 S.E.2d at 598).
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VI. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS AND THEIR IMPACTS
Although other jurisdictions have articulated easement liability
standards, Florida law remains unclear regarding the liability of dominant
and servient owners in the absence of express agreement. Secondary
sources and attorneys alike urge that the first step a landowner concerned
about liability for injuries should take is to carefully articulate the
maintenance responsibility in an express agreement, preferably at the time
the express easement is granted.159 Carrying adequate liability insurance to
cover potential injuries on easements is another important step.160 The
servient owner may also go so far as to require in the easement granted that
the dominant owner obtain and maintain casualty and liability insurance
over his interest on the servient estate.161 However, many individual
owners of either easements or land subject to easements do not properly or
thoroughly address maintenance duties. Additionally, in the absence of
prudent legal counsel, these individuals do not become aware of the need
for express agreements and of the liability to which they are subject until
something goes awry. Thus, it is vital to construct a concrete standard that
clears up what result to expect in the absence of an express maintenance
agreement, which is indeed “‘a gray area’”162 in the law.
Three potential candidates emerge as potentially viable solutions—
legislative action in the form of statutory liability, judicial adoption of the
new Restatement approach,163 and judicial adoption of the “control”
standard. Ultimately, only one of these three best comports with Florida
case law while yielding predictable, equitable results consistent with
traditional tort and property law principles.
A. Legislative Action
In Florida, one possible solution to this ambiguous area of the law is
legislative action: for example, a statute passed by the state legislature
declaring the respective liabilities of dominant and servient owners for
injuries incurred on easements in the absence of express agreement.164 One
state, Oregon, has decided to take legislative action regarding the duty to
maintain easements.165 The relevant provision provides:
The cost of maintaining the easement in repair in the
absence of an agreement and in the absence of maintenance
159. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 10, § 8:37; 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.12[2]; Brooks,
supra note 4.
160. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 10, § 8:37; Brooks, supra note 4.
161. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 10, § 8:37; see Stevens v. Grody, 746 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2002).
162. Brooks, supra note 4 (quoting Catherine C. Kirk).
163. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, supra note 9, § 4.13.
164. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 10, § 8:37 n.11.
165. Id. § 8:37 n.11; OR. REV. STAT. § 105.175 (3) (2009).
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provisions in a recorded instrument creating the easement
shall be shared by each holder of an interest in the easement
in proportion to the use made of the easement by each holder
of an interest in the easement.166
In determining proportionate use, the Oregon statute provides that the
size, weight, and frequency of use of vehicles on the easement are relevant
factors.167 The normal distance of use over the easement by the parties
involved is also relevant in calculating proportionate use.168 The statute
concludes by clarifying that if an easement holder damages the easement
by negligence or abnormal use, that dominant owner must bear the expense
of repair.169
Such legislative action can significantly help ameliorate the ambiguity
surrounding these issues by creating a clear, general rule. Easement owners
and those who own land subject to easements of way alike can rely upon
such a rule in helping them determine what insurance coverage is
necessary and when, and at what cost, they should pursue express
maintenance and liability agreements. However, a statutory standard has its
drawbacks. By creating a bright-line rule, the statute prohibits a case-bycase factual inquiry that helps courts determine an equitable outcome to
each individual case. Such analysis has become a critical, and often
dispositive, factor in determining these types of cases, especially under the
“control” standard explained and applied in cases such as Sutera.170
B. The New Restatement Approach
An alternative approach is to adopt the Third Restatement of Property:
Servitudes, which allows consideration of duties owed to third parties on
easements to creep into its provision regarding duties of repair and
maintenance.171 Section 4.13 states that absent express agreement, the
dominant estate has a duty to repair and maintain the portions it controls of
the servient estate, “to the extent necessary to (a) prevent unreasonable
interference with the enjoyment of the servient estate, or (b) avoid liability
of the servient-estate owner to third parties.”172 Apart from citing to and
rehashing the general “may be liable in tort for injuries to third persons”
language from Bruce and Ely’s The Law of Easements and Licenses in
166. OR. REV. STAT. § 105.175 (3) (2009).
167. Id. § 105.175 (4)(a).
168. Id. § 105.175 (4)(b).
169. Id. § 105.175 (4)(c).
170. Sutera v. Go Jokir, Inc., 86 F.3d 298, 308 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Cardinal v. Long Island
Power Auth., 309 F. Supp. 2d 376, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); McIntyre v. Boston Redevelopment
Auth., 595 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
171. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, supra note 9, § 4.13.
172. Id.
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Land, however, the comment, illustrations, and reporter’s note following
§ 4.13 fail to further explore the liability of servient owners.173
The language of the provision itself is still helpful nonetheless. First,
the provision distinguishes “prevent[ing] unreasonable interference with
the enjoyment of the servient estate” as distinct from avoiding liability to
third parties.174 Such a distinction is important because it acknowledges
that some maintenance duties benefit the servient estate, while others
benefit third parties. In contrast, most treatises only address duties owed
between the dominant and servient owners. Second, the provision restricts
the dominant estate’s duty to avoid liability for injuries to third parties to
“the portions of the servient estate and the improvements used in the
enjoyment of the servitude that are under the [dominant estate’s]
control.”175 This limitation appears to come directly from the line of cases
holding that liability for injuries to third parties is premised on control of
the property at issue.176 However, the provision fails to address the result
when both the dominant and servient estates may be said to have “control”
over the easement, and it omits the possibility that the servient estate may
alone be liable for injuries to third parties.177
C. The “Control” Standard
To best tackle this complex area of the law, Florida should adopt and
articulate New York’s “control” standard.178 This standard best protects
“innocent” dominant and servient owners, allowing for the application of
traditional negligence principles to yield equitable results, while remaining
consistent with existing Florida case law.179 Florida case law appears to
reflect the principles underlying the control standard, but the vague,
undeveloped language of its opinions has left landowners and attorneys
guessing. A clear articulation of the control standard, perhaps by the
Florida Supreme Court, would firmly establish that for injuries to third
parties on easements of way, in the absence of express agreement, both the
dominant and servient owners may be held liable, depending on a finding
of which party can be said to “control” the easement. Such finding would
be based on examination of all relevant factors, including prior
maintenance on the easement, the frequency and intensity of use by both
owners, and the status of the third party with respect to both owners. Thus,
the owner who can be said to “control” the easement may be held liable for
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. See Sutera v. Go Jokir, Inc., 86 F.3d 298, 308 (2d Cir. 1996).
177. See id.
178. See supra Part V.C.
179. See Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d 1003, 1005 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Zipkin v. Rubin
Constr. Co., 418 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Morrill v. Recreational Dev., Inc., 414
So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
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injuries to a third party. Similarly, if both owners are found to exert some
degree of “control” over the easement, each may be held liable to the
extent he is found to control the easement. Such a standard is consistent
with, yet greatly clarifies, the Collom v. Holton and Zipkin decisions,
providing superior guidance to Florida’s dominant and servient owners
while yielding equitable results.180
VII. CONCLUSION
This Note has unveiled a plethora of potential situations, circumstances,
and factors that play into determining liability for injuries to third parties
on easements of way. These factors include the nature of the agreement
between the dominant and servient estates, the ongoing relationship
between the two with respect to the easement, the nature of the easement
itself, and the status of the third party. Corpus Juris Secundum best
summarizes this area of the law, writing “[c]ircumstances surrounding a
grant of an easement and its use are sufficiently divers so as to preclude a
universal rule either of liability or immunity for easement owners in
actions for wrongs brought by third parties.”181 Attempts by
Pennsylvania182 and Oregon183 to corner this complex area of the law using
bright-line rules are facially attractive by virtue of their simplicity, but can
yield inequitable results because they reject the application of traditional
tort principles, such as the undertaker’s doctrine.184 To minimize the
confusion surrounding existing law while providing an equitable solution
to Floridians, this Note argues that the best resolution is an adoption of
New York’s “control” standard. By adopting this standard, Florida will
provide clarity and guidance to this complicated area of the law, while
simultaneously remaining consistent with its case law and yielding
equitable results.

180. See Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d at 1005 n.1; Zipkin, 418 So. 2d at 1043; Morrill, 414
So. 2d at 591.
181. 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 395 (2000).
182. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
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